Marginal Pricing and Student Investment in Higher Education by Hemelt, Steven W. & Stange, Kevin M.
 
 
 
Marginal Pricing and Student Investment in Higher Education∗ 
 
 
 
Steven W. Hemelt 
University of North Carolina  
at Chapel Hill 
 
Kevin M. Stange 
University of Michigan 
and NBER 
 
 
 
 
October 2015 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of marginal price on students’ educational investments using rich 
administrative data on students at Michigan public universities. Marginal price refers to the 
amount colleges charge for each additional credit taken in a semester. Institutions differ in how 
they price credits above the full-time minimum (of 12 credits), with many institutions reducing 
the marginal price of such credits to zero. We find that a zero marginal price induces a modest 
share of students (i.e., 7 percent) to attempt up to one additional class (i.e., 3 credits) but also 
increases withdrawals and lowers course performance. The analysis generally suggests minimal 
impacts on credits earned and the likelihood of meeting “on-time” benchmarks toward college 
completion, though estimates for these outcomes are less precise and more variable across 
specifications. Consistent with theory, the effect on attempted credits is largest among students 
who would otherwise locate at the full-time minimum, which include lower-achieving and 
socioeconomically disadvantaged students. 
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I. Introduction 
Only slightly more than half of recent college entrants graduate within six years (Shapiro 
et al., 2013) and time-to-degree has increased particularly for students from low-income families 
(Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner, 2012). Such statistics have propelled those in federal, state, and 
local policy circles to call for proposals aimed at increasing rates of degree completion and 
shortening time-to-degree among college-goers (e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2010). Indeed, recent proposals from the Obama administration suggest tying federal aid to 
graduation rates and timely degree completion (Lewin, 2013).  
In the face of such pressure, many institutions have looked at changes in tuition policies 
as a means of generating revenue while also maintaining or improving student success. Marginal 
price is an important dimension of institutions’ pricing structures about which little is known. By 
marginal price, we mean the price students are charged incrementally for each additional course 
(or credit) they take in a given semester. Many students only take the minimum course load to 
achieve full-time status (i.e., 12 credits), which at most institutions would translate to earning a 
Bachelor’s degree in five years or more. At some institutions, the marginal price of credits taken 
above 12 is zero; others have a linear, per-credit marginal price for all credit levels. Indeed, some 
institutions have adopted “flat” pricing (i.e., zero marginal cost for credits above 12) in explicit 
expectation that students will respond by attempting and earning more credits and graduating 
faster.1  
How individuals react to nonlinear price schedules is central to many areas of economics 
and policymaking, as proposals in a variety of domains are predicated on the microeconomic 
                                                 
1 From an institution’s perspective, while there may be some concern about losing revenue when switching from a 
per-credit to a flat-pricing approach, savings may also result from students graduating in a timelier manner. In 
addition, institutions particularly concerned about such revenue losses may choose to slowly increase the price 
charged for 12 credits over time to counteract any losses from a flat-pricing approach (Baum, McDemmond, Jones, 
2014). 
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principle that individuals respond to marginal price. The design of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), many savings and retirement programs, and public health insurance programs all 
incorporate nonlinear price schedules to achieve policy goals, as do pricing schedules in many 
consumer markets such as phone and energy services.  
Whether and how individuals respond to these marginal incentives remains largely an 
open question with recent empirical evidence from other contexts mixed and no evidence from 
the setting of education.2 A weak evidence base has not prevented colleges from touting 
nonlinear pricing as one solution to colleges’ goals of increasing timely graduation rates. For 
example, Adams State in Colorado recently made such a switch from per-credit (linear) to flat 
(nonlinear) pricing, citing this shift as the reason average credit hours have increased in just two 
years (Mumper, 2012). Similar policy shifts have been observed at Montana State, the University 
of Texas, and many other institutions (Baum, Conklin, & Johnson, 2013). However, whether 
nonlinear pricing alters students’ investment intensity as predicted by economic theory is not 
known.  
This paper is the first to examine the effect of marginal price on educational investment. 
We focus on the effect of exposure to a “flat” pricing scheme at a university, wherein the 
marginal price of additional credits above the full-time minimum is zero, relative to a linear 
tuition-pricing scheme. Our contributions are fourfold. First, we add to the growing evidence 
base on whether individuals respond to marginal incentives embedded in nonlinear price 
schedules, albeit in a new and policy-important context. As human capital investment is one of 
                                                 
2 Saez (2010) finds that the self-employed respond to the first kink in the nonlinear EITC schedule, but the response 
to subsequent kinks and for wage and salary workers is minimal. Ito (2013, 2014) finds that electricity and water 
consumers respond to average price, not the marginal price embedded in the nonlinear price schedules they face. For 
evidence from other settings, see Hausman (1981) for federal income tax, Friedberg (2000) for retirement savings 
plans, Kowalski (2012) for health insurance, Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins (2007) for water, and Borenstein 
(2012) for energy services. In their review of the transfer and human capital programs created in the 1960s, Bitler 
and Karoly (2015) conclude that individuals respond to the marginal incentives embedded in many of these 
programs. Moffitt (1990) reviews the early literature on nonlinear pricing.  
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the most important economic decisions individuals make, evidence about whether the standard 
model applies to this setting is useful. Second, we exploit variation in the pricing structure faced 
by similar individuals in very similar choice contexts. Much of the previous literature on 
nonlinear budget constraints focuses on contexts in which similar individuals face the same price 
structure (e.g., the federal tax code), which creates numerous econometric problems such as the 
fact that tax rates (and thus marginal incentives) are endogenous or that individuals with different 
marginal incentives may be quite different.3 Third, we provide the first evidence on the effects of 
a policy that many higher education institutions and states have turned to as a way to boost 
timely degree completion. Identifying effective policies has become critical as federal and state 
funding is increasingly tied to graduation rates and timely degree completion (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2010; Lewin, 2013). 4 Finally, our study informs the revenue 
consequences of institutions’ pricing regimes. Public institutions increasingly rely on tuition 
revenue to supplant declines in state appropriations and many have avoided across-the-board 
tuition increases, instead altering other features of their pricing policies.  
We assess the effect of marginal price using administrative data on all Michigan public 
high school graduates in the classes of 2008 through 2011 who attended one of the state’s public 
universities. Michigan is a compelling setting to study, as there is substantial policy variation 
across very similar institutions, which is not present in other states.5 Figure 1 depicts the price 
schedule at two pairs of Michigan’s fifteen public universities. Each pair of universities has an 
                                                 
3 Ito (2013, 2014) are exceptions. Moffitt (1990) reviews several of the econometric problems and Saez, Slemrod, 
and Giertz (2012) discuss similar issues in the context of taxable income. 
4 Lengthening time to degree is not solely an issue for postsecondary institutions. It is costly for students as well. 
Students that set themselves on a longer path to college completion forego time in the labor market, demand more 
resources to finish, and may heighten risks of stop-out. 
5 Our study focuses on public universities in Michigan because of the availability of rich transcript data and because 
the state appears unique in having substantial policy variation among similar institutions, likely because tuition 
policy is not set centrally. While focusing on a single state and sector controls for many possible confounders, it 
raises the question of external validity. We discuss the issue of external validity in Appendix D and present evidence 
from two other states that supports our conclusions from the Michigan experience. 
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identical interquartile range of student ACT scores and similar prices for part-time students, yet 
quite different marginal prices for full-time students. Full-time students at Western Michigan and 
University of Michigan-Flint pay little additional tuition for courses taken beyond the full-time 
minimum, in contrast to those at Central Michigan and Ferris State. Of all public universities in 
the state, eight charge full-time students per credit taken, while students at the other seven pay 
greatly reduced marginal tuition.6 The subsidy embedded in this nonlinear price structure is 
substantial: 20 percent of the direct costs of college among those who take five classes in a 
semester ($740 to $1,260 for each additional 3-credit course). Though there are some differences 
in the characteristics of students attending institutions with per-credit pricing and those with flat 
pricing, there is considerable overlap between these two groups. We rely on a selection-on-
observables assumption combined with this institutional overlap to identify the causal effect of 
marginal price on credit accumulation. Conditional on our rich set of individual controls, we 
assume that students are not choosing universities based on the marginal pricing policy. We 
think this is a reasonable assumption in this case given that tuition information advertised in 
college guidebooks and financial aid packages is for the average or typical student, which by 
definition does not vary with credit load.  
We find that exposure to flat tuition pricing has only a small (statistically insignificant) 
effect on the average number of credits attempted, but induces a modest share (7 percent) of 
students to attempt a few more credits (i.e., up to one course, or 3 credits, more). Yet, we find 
little evidence that these additional attempted credits translate into more earned credits in a 
semester. Students facing no marginal price are more likely to withdraw from at least one course 
and also have lower GPAs. Accordingly, flat pricing is not associated with increased cumulative 
                                                 
6 Flat pricing institutions typically charge additional tuition beyond some upper threshold (typically 18 credits) and 
two charge very modest additional tuition beyond 12 credits. 
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credits earned, greater persistence, or reduced time-to-degree, though estimates of these 
outcomes are admittedly imprecise. Theory predicts that the greatest attempted-credit response 
would be among students who would take the full-time minimum under linear pricing (largely 
minority and economically disadvantaged students in the bottom of the achievement 
distribution), which is precisely what we find. There is no evidence to suggest that this pricing 
structure influences students’ decisions to enroll part- versus full-time, likely because any 
marginal pricing effect is swamped by discontinuities in financial aid eligibility or other 
considerations. Various approaches to eliminating observed differences – rich controls, sample 
restrictions, propensity score re-weighting, exact matching on observables – as well as various 
alternative specifications all suggest similar qualitative results.  
For institutions that currently do not charge students at the margin, our results suggest 
that increasing the marginal price associated with credit intensity will minimally affect students’ 
rate of progress towards degree and on-time degree completion and may thus be a non-
distortionary way of raising revenue. For institutions that currently charge per-credit, eliminating 
the marginal price is unlikely to improve student outcomes. However, our analysis does not fully 
address other possible effects of marginal pricing, including major choice, interest exploration, 
or financial burden.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses previous literature, with a 
focus on the relationship between tuition pricing and progress through college. Section III 
provides background on university pricing in the Michigan context. Section IV presents a simple 
theoretical framework to guide our empirical work and help with interpretation of results. 
Section V describes the data used in the analyses and our empirical strategy. Section VI presents 
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results on credit-taking and student performance and explores their robustness. Section VII 
concludes. 
II. Previous Literature 
There is a large body of evidence showing that students’ enrollment, persistence, and 
college choices are influenced by net college price. A consensus estimate is that a $1,000 change 
in college price (1990 dollars) is associated with a 3 to 5 percentage point difference in 
enrollment rates (Kane, 2006; Dynarski, 2003). Evidence on the effect of college price on 
persistence and degree completion is rarer, but most studies suggest that persistence and 
completion are modestly responsive to prices for at least some groups (Bettinger, 2004; Turner, 
2004; Dynarski, 2008; DesJardins & McCall, 2010; Goldrick-Rab et al., 2011; Castleman & 
Long, 2013). Price also appears to be a strong predictor of the specific college students choose to 
attend (Long, 2004; Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2013; Hemelt & Marcotte, 2015), institution-level 
enrollment (Hemelt & Marcotte, 2011), and major choice (Stange, 2015). While suggestive of 
price response in educational investment, this literature does not speak to whether students 
respond to changes in marginal, as opposed to average, price. 
We are aware of only one study that examines the relationship between marginal pricing 
and student outcomes. In a working paper, Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2010) found that 4-
year public institutions with per-credit pricing had lower 4-year graduation rates than those with 
flat pricing. Further, much of the increase in time-to-degree between 1972 and 1992 occurred at 
institutions that charge on a per-credit basis.7 While suggestive, this relationship could be due to 
student or institutional differences that happen to correlate with marginal pricing, rather than the 
causal effect of marginal pricing per se. 
                                                 
7 The analysis of per-credit versus flat pricing appeared in two footnotes and was not central to their main analysis 
so was dropped in the subsequent published version of the paper.  
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At the same time, a number of interventions have been found to increase students’ credit 
loads, either intentionally or inadvertently. For instance, the Promise Scholarship in West 
Virginia explicitly tied aid to number of credits (and GPA), and resulted in more students taking 
15 credits rather than the full-time minimum (Scott-Clayton, 2010). A similar result was found 
for a scholarship program at the University of New Mexico (Miller, Binder, Harris, & Krause, 
2011). Yet, work on Georgia’s HOPE scholarship, which tied eligibility and retention of funds to 
maintaining a 3.0 GPA, found that HOPE reduced the likelihood students took full course loads 
and increased their propensity to withdraw from classes and divert credits to the summer 
(Cornwell et al., 2005).  
Other conditional aid grant programs (often in conjunction with advising or coaching) 
have also had impacts on students’ credit loads. For instance, Richburg-Hayes et al. (2009) found 
that a performance-based scholarship at community colleges in New Orleans increased credit 
loads, as did an intervention that combined financial incentives and academic support services at 
a Canadian university (Angrist, Lang, & Oreopoulos, 2009). At a large Italian university, 
Garibaldi, Giavazzi, Ichino, and Rettore (2012) found that charging students extra for taking too 
long to graduate speeds up time-to-degree. 
Together, these studies make clear that particular features of scholarship and grant 
programs can have appreciable effects (positive or negative) on students’ credit loads and 
progression through college. We look at marginal pricing policy as another potential lever 
capable of influencing students’ credit loads – and ultimately their rates of college completion 
and average time-to-degree. Since the interventions described above often tie awards explicitly 
to credit-taking behavior and also typically target select student subgroups, they may not be 
indicative of the potential effects of marginal pricing. 
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III. Background on University Pricing in Michigan 
During the 2011-2012 academic year, eight of Michigan’s fifteen public 4-year 
universities charged full-time undergraduate students differently based on number of credits. In 
these schools, tuition is a linear function of the number of credits taken, ranging from a low of 
$246 per credit at Saginaw Valley State University to a high of $421 at Michigan Technological 
University. By contrast, the tuition schedule at the other seven institutions has a flat or near-flat 
range at full-time status (12 credits). Students at these institutions pay a per-credit amount if part-
time, but almost no additional monetary cost for taking an additional course once they have 
reached full-time status.8 The upper limit for which the zero marginal price applies varies from 
16 to 18 credits. While per-credit pricing is generally more common at less selective institutions 
(all of the state’s community colleges charge per-credit while the state flagship university, 
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, does not), this is not always the case. Further, some 
institutions have explicitly adopted flat pricing models to encourage students to take 15 credits, 
while others have switched from the use of flat pricing to charging per credit (e.g., Ferris State in 
2008-2009).  
Tuition fees apply to any credits attempted in a semester after the course “drop date,” 
regardless of outcome of the course (pass, fail, withdrawal, etc.). Students are generally given 
one or two weeks to withdraw from classes while still receiving a full (or near-full) refund of 
tuition and fees. There does not seem to be any systematic difference in these policies by pricing 
practice. Flat-pricing institutions in Michigan do not appear to be disproportionately more 
generous (or strict) in their refund polices than do their per-credit pricing peers.  
                                                 
8 Appendix Table A1 includes more details about the pricing practices of the fifteen institutions. Two institutions, 
UM-Dearborn and UM-Flint, charge a substantially lower per-credit fee ($80) once students reach full-time status. 
We characterize these institutions has having “flat” pricing in our analysis. 
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Marginal pricing is just one feature of pricing policies at these institutions. During the 
2011-2012 academic year, seven charged differentially based on undergraduate level and three 
charged differently for certain programs or majors (Presidents Council, State Universities of 
Michigan, 2011). In this regard, Michigan institutions have pricing policies that are quite similar 
to institutions nationally (Cornell Higher Education Research Institute, 2011; Ehrenberg, 2012).  
IV. Theoretical Framework 
A. Basic Model and Predictions 
We develop a static (single-period) model of school intensity choice to better understand 
how the tuition-pricing schedule alters postsecondary investment. Suppose individual utility 
depends positively on lifetime consumption c and on time spent not in school, n. Thus school 
attendance incurs effort cost that is increasing with the level of intensity. Individuals choose time 
spent in school, z, to maximize utility u(c,n) subject to a budget constraint and a standard time 
constraint.9 The number of credits taken can be thought of as one measure of z. The budget 
constraint states that consumption equals the sum of endowed income (I) and lifetime earnings 
minus tuition: 𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼 + 𝐸𝐸(𝑧𝑧) − 𝑇𝑇(𝑧𝑧). In the single-period model, we simplify things by assuming 
that each increment of schooling increases earning potential by a fixed amount w, thus 𝐸𝐸(𝑧𝑧) =
𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧. This simplification allows us to abstract from effects of nonlinearities in the returns to 
college education and to focus on the decision about the number of credits taken in a single 
period.10 Tuition is a nonlinear function of credit load, changing discretely as credit load 
surpasses a threshold 𝑧𝑧∗: 
                                                 
9 The time constraint is that total time spent in (z) and out (n) of school equals total time available, H: n + z = H. 
10 Stange (2012) discusses the evidence on and implications of nonlinearities in returns and the dynamic nature of 
schooling investment. Ignoring the nonlinearities in returns is like ignoring “career concerns” in labor supply 
models, letting us treat schooling decisions made in different time periods independently. We discuss below how 
relaxing these assumptions may affect our results. 
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𝑇𝑇(𝑧𝑧) = � 𝑡𝑡0 + 𝑡𝑡1𝑧𝑧 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧 < 𝑧𝑧∗
𝑡𝑡0 + 𝑡𝑡1𝑧𝑧∗ + 𝑡𝑡2(𝑧𝑧 − 𝑧𝑧∗) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧 ≥ 𝑧𝑧∗ , 
where typically 𝑡𝑡1 > 𝑡𝑡2.11 Together these elements generate the nonlinear budget constraint 
depicted by the solid line in Figure 2. Below z* (i.e., the full-time minimum credit load), each 
increment of schooling investment increases lifetime consumption by (w - 𝑡𝑡1). Above 𝑧𝑧∗, the net 
return to each unit of investment is higher and thus the “price” of non-school time is also higher. 
The dashed line depicts a linear tuition schedule where students pay a constant amount per credit. 
How individuals respond to nonlinear budget constraints is complex, as reviewed in 
Moffitt (1990). One finding is that a policy shift from a linear (dashed) to flat (solid) pricing 
schedule will generate quite heterogeneous responses across students. Students that would locate 
at 𝑧𝑧∗ when facing a linear pricing schedule (denoted by B) experience only a substitution effect 
(non-school time has become more expensive) and would be predicted to increase their credit 
intensity. However, students initially choosing to enroll beyond the full-time minimum (denoted 
by A) also experience an income effect, thus the net effect for this group is ambiguous. Part-time 
students who would locate below z* when pricing is linear (denoted C) will either remain on the 
first segment (zero response) or switch segments by increasing credit loads above full-time.12 
This simple budget set analysis suggests that response may be greatest for students who 
otherwise would choose to locate at the full-time minimum. In fact, continuous preferences 
would predict we observe a “hole” in the density of students at the non-convex kink B. Our 
empirical analysis explores this heterogeneity by stratifying our sample by students’ predicted 
credits (based on baseline characteristics) when faced with a linear pricing scheme. 
                                                 
11 We also ignore any increased marginal tuition for very high credit loads (typically 17 or 18 credits). 
12 Facing the new pricing schedule, there will be some people that are indifferent between the two segments. 
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B. Extensions to the Basic Model 
While the basic static model predicts positive (or non-negative) effects of flat pricing on 
investment intensity for most students (particularly those who would otherwise choose the full-
time minimum), several factors may mitigate this incentive or cause minimal impact on the 
number of credits that students actually earn. For instance, if the effort cost (essentially how 
utility decreases with z) rises sharply around the full-time minimum (z*), then even large 
decreases in marginal price could have minimal impact on student course-taking. This may be 
particularly true since the number of credits is finite and “lumpy” as most classes are worth 
either 3 or 4 credits. Even if it were optimal to increase credit load by one unit, this may not be 
feasible for many students. Such adjustment costs have been found to mute responses to 
nonlinear incentives in other contexts (Chetty et al., 2011).  
The basic model also assumes that people choose credit loads with perfect foresight about 
future effort costs, course completion, enrollment, and degree completion. Generally, current 
choices will be less responsive to price when uncertainty is high – since the consequences of 
current decisions depend on these uncertain future outcomes. Related, students may misperceive 
the true marginal effort cost when making course enrollment decisions by, for instance, being 
overly confident about their ability to manage a heavier course load. In this case, flat pricing may 
have different effects on credits attempted and credits earned or could affect course performance. 
Finally, strong nonlinear returns to degree receipt could mitigate impacts of flat pricing on term-
level course-taking as the nonlinear return would dominate intensity decisions.13 While the basic 
model suggests that reductions in marginal price could induce students to take and earn more 
credits and speed up degree progress, several realistic extensions demonstrate how this policy 
lever could be quite muted in practice.  
                                                 
13 In Appendix B, we discuss these factors and develop their implications more formally. 
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V. Data and Empirical Approach 
A. Data and Samples 
We combine student-level data from several different administrative sources. From the 
Michigan Consortium for Education Research (MCER), we begin with information on the 
universe of Michigan public high school graduates from 2008 through 2011. These data include 
demographic characteristics during high school (sex, race, ethnicity, free and reduced-price 
meals eligibility (FARM), limited-English proficiency (LEP), special education status), 11th 
grade achievement scores, and high school attended.14 We then use data from the National 
Student Clearinghouse (NSC) to restrict our sample to students appearing in college (anywhere 
up to August 2012).15  
To examine credit accumulation at Michigan public institutions, we next merge these 
records of college-going Michigan high school graduates onto data from the Michigan Student 
Transcript and Academic Record Repository (STARR). STARR contains full, historical 
transcript records (course-level data) for all individuals enrolled in 2-year or 4-year public 
colleges in Michigan in the 2011-2012 academic year. While the state of Michigan mandated the 
collection of entire transcripts of students enrolled at any Michigan public college during that 
year, there is some (small) variation in the degree to which institutions supplied course-taking 
information from prior years. Therefore, we focus on STARR data from the Fall of 2011 and 
Spring of 2012. These semesters occur at different points in an “on-time” college trajectory for 
students, depending on the year of their high school graduation. For example, the 2011-2012 
academic year corresponds to the on-time third year of college for the high school class of 2009. 
                                                 
14 We use a student’s composite ACT score since the ACT became a mandatory part of Michigan’s high school 
testing in 2007. 
15 For an extensive overview of the coverage and use of National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) data for research, 
please consult Dynarski, Hemelt, and Hyman (2015). For the state of Michigan during our timeframe, enrollment 
coverage is quite high (i.e., between 95 and 97 percent), and highest among 4-year public institutions (100 percent). 
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Therefore, we also examine whether students’ postsecondary persistence (and relatedly, the 
composition of our sample) is related to flat pricing. 
Our main analytic sample includes students from these high school cohorts (i.e., 2008 
through 2011) who are enrolled full- or part-time in a Michigan public 4-year institution during 
the fall and/or spring of the 2011-2012 academic year. This results in 212,473 student-by-
semester observations (over 112,000 unique students) across all high school cohorts. For most 
analyses we restrict our sample to students not attending the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 
(187,860 observations) and to only full-time students (171,058 observations excluding UM-AA). 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the students and institutions in our analytic 
sample, as well as college-level credit outcomes by institutional pricing structure. There are 
some small to moderate differences in the average characteristics of students attending per-credit 
versus flat-pricing institutions. Overall, students attending flat-pricing schools are more 
advantaged (less likely to have been eligible for free or reduced-price meals, less likely to be 
minority) and have higher college admissions scores. Though, as illustrated by the final two 
columns in Table 1, the achievement advantage of students at flat schools is largely driven by the 
fact that the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor (UM-AA) uses a flat tuition-pricing schedule. 
Excluding UM-AA, student characteristics are quite similar at flat and per-credit schools. Flat 
schools also tend to have more resources and be more selective, but again this pattern reverses 
when UM-AA is excluded.16 
Turning to outcome differences, average credit loads of students at flat schools are a bit 
higher than those at per-credit schools. Indeed, the share of students attempting more than 12 
credits in a semester is about 8 to 12 percentage points higher at flat schools than at per-credit 
                                                 
16 In order to achieve greater balance on student characteristics, we drop UM-AA from our main results. However, 
this has the effect of creating imbalance on institutional resources. Reassuringly, results that include UM-AA are 
very similar. 
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institutions. Some mean differences vary more than others as a function of the sample: For 
example, the share earning 15 or more credits in a semester is about 11 percentage points higher 
at flat colleges; but, when the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor is excluded from the sample, 
this difference falls to under 4 percentage points. Obviously, these raw differences in means do 
not control for other attributes of students and schools that are likely correlated with course-
taking behavior and progress through college. 
B. Empirical Approach and Identification Strategy 
Our goal is to compare the behavior of students who face a nonlinear budget constraint 
(the solid line in Figure 2) to similar students facing a linear constraint (dashed line). Our main 
approach is to compare credits taken by students attending flat-pricing schools (at which the 
marginal price is zero for credits above the full-time minimum) to those attending per-credit-
pricing schools, invoking a selection-on-observables assumption. Since the basic framework 
predicts heterogeneous responses according to students’ course-taking tendencies, we also make 
such comparisons within narrowly defined student groups. We estimate a linear probability 
model with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) of the form: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (1) 
In this specification, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a measure of credits attempted or earned by individual i from 
cohort c attending school j during semester t. Our primary outcome variables are total credit load 
and indicators for attempting or earning a credit load greater than certain thresholds (e.g., at least 
13 credits or at least 15 credits). We also examine indicators for course withdrawals and failure, 
as well as semester GPA. 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for whether school j has flat pricing, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a 
vector of student-level measures of achievement and demographics during high school, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 is a 
set of semester fixed effects, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 represents cohort fixed effects, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a stochastic error 
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term. Some specifications control for a limited number of institution-level covariates (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖). The 
primary coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽1, the effect of flat pricing on our outcome of interest (e.g., 
student credit-taking or course performance). To account for correlation in the errors among 
students at the same college, one would usually employ traditional clustering methods at the 
institution level. However, since cluster-robust standard errors perform poorly in settings with 
few clusters, we use the wild-bootstrap cluster procedure developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller (2008). A drawback of this procedure is that it is not possible to generate estimates of the 
standard errors or confidence intervals, thus we report p-values throughout. 
The main identifying assumption of our approach is that unobserved student- and 
institution-level determinants of outcomes are uncorrelated with pricing structure. Conditional on 
our rich set of individual controls, we assume that students are not choosing universities based on 
the marginal pricing policy. We think this is a reasonable assumption in this context because the 
marginal pricing policy is not terribly salient to potential enrollees; college guidebooks stress the 
average or typical list price and financial aid packages are based on total cost-of-attendance for a 
typical student, which (by default) does not vary with credit load. The marginal price becomes 
salient at the point when students register for classes.  
We address three remaining possible sources of bias in this basic model. First, students 
attending “flat” schools may possess different characteristics that are correlated with college 
performance than those attending per-credit schools. While this is certainly true overall, it is 
worth noting that there is considerable student overlap on observable characteristics across 
institutions. Figure 3 depicts the inter-quartile range of ACT scores for all fifteen institutions. 
With the exception of the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor (a flat pricing school), every flat 
school has several non-flat schools with considerable test score overlap. Further, we control for a 
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rich array of student-level characteristics including ACT score, sex, race, free and reduced-price 
meal eligibility, limited English proficiency, and special education status.17 Our sample size 
permits us to do this extremely flexibly by looking within student groups defined very narrowly 
by full interactions between these characteristics. In addition, we estimate models that instrument 
for pricing structure using the policy of the nearest university to students’ high schools or that 
include high school fixed effects.  
Second, additional financial aid could offset the additional tuition and fees associated 
with additional credits, diminishing the treatment. Grant programs may explicitly increase in 
value as number of credits increases or cost-of-attendance could be adjusted upwards (increasing 
eligibility) when additional credits are taken. By design at the federal level, the maximum Pell 
amount increases discretely at quarter-time, half-time, three-quarters-time, and full-time, but 
does not increase in value beyond 12 credits. We are not aware of any institution, state, or federal 
programs that explicitly increase aid for additional credits taken beyond 12. Further, most 
students who receive the Pell at these universities are receiving the maximum amount, so 
increases in their cost-of-attendance due to higher credit loads will not increase the amount of 
grant aid for which they are eligible. 
Finally, it is possible that schools’ pricing schemes coincide with other college-level 
attributes or policies that may influence outcomes, such as resources or advising. Our focus on 
the public 4-year sector in one state eliminates many institutional differences that correlate with 
pricing structure nationally, but we cannot entirely rule out this possibility. We take three 
approaches to address this issue. First, we include an institution-level control for median ACT 
                                                 
17 Figures C1 and C2 in Appendix C plot predicted probabilities of attending a flat-pricing institution (via a probit 
model) as a function of student-level characteristics (i.e., gender, race and ethnicity, ACT score, FARM, LEP, and 
special education status) by school type. These graphs illustrate clear common support, regardless of whether we 
include the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor in our sample. 
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composite scores of incoming freshman or several other measures of institutional resources. 
Second, we examine differences in credit-taking among students attempting less than a full-time 
load (whose behavior should be minimally affected by the pricing scheme for full-time students) 
as a falsification test. Third, we exclude University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, which is an outlier 
both in terms of student characteristics and institutional resources, from our preferred 
specifications.  
It is worth contrasting our simple approach to those employed in other settings with 
nonlinear pricing. In many settings, similar individuals face the same price structure, so 
individuals with different marginal incentives are quite different. For instance, much of the 
variation in marginal incentives in the federal tax code is across families with very different 
incomes. In addition, the fact that tax rates are determined by income means that marginal 
incentives are endogenous to many of the outcomes under study (e.g., work behavior). A number 
of empirical strategies have been developed for these settings, such as measuring “bunching” at 
budget set kinks (Saez, 2010), instrumenting for tax rates using changes in the tax rate structure 
(reviewed in Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012)), or structural approaches (Hausman, 1985). 
Relative to these other methods, our setting permits a very transparent comparison between 
observably identical students that face quite different marginal incentives. 
VI. Results 
A. Distribution of Credits Attempted and Earned 
Figure 4 plots the fraction of all students at or above each credit threshold, separately by 
pricing policy for our full sample (of students and institutions). We see little difference in the 
distribution of credits taken (and earned) by part-time students regardless of pricing policy – but, 
modest differences emerge right at the point where the marginal price diverges between the two 
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sets of institutions (i.e., 12 credits). Students that face no marginal tuition price of a heavier 
course load are more likely to take (and possibly earn) credits beyond the full-time minimum. At 
first glance, these patterns suggest that marginal pricing policy may have some impact on course-
taking and credit accumulation. 
B. Main Results 
The raw differences reported in Figure 4 may overstate the true causal effects of flat 
pricing because students attending flat pricing schools are slightly higher achieving and 
advantaged, which likely have independent effects on course-taking. Table 2 presents our main 
regression estimates, which control for a rich set of individual covariates and median institution-
level ACT scores and also exclude the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor.18 We see no 
detectable impact of flat pricing on average credits attempted and no evidence that flat pricing 
affects average credits earned. In this table and throughout much of the paper we focus on full-
time students. Flat pricing does not appear to affect the decision to enroll full-time (i.e., 12 or 
more credits) and the inclusion of part-time students does not meaningfully change our point 
estimates for any outcome (columns 3 and 6).19 However, including part-time students reduces 
precision by adding residual variation to our outcomes. 
Flat tuition pricing is associated with an increase in the likelihood that students attempt at 
least 13 credits (more than the full-time minimum) of about 7 percentage points (relative to a 
base of 79 percent, p-value = 0.03). Since estimates at both the 13 and 15 attempted credit 
thresholds are similar, this implies that these students are attempting about 3 additional credits, 
                                                 
18 The coefficients on individual covariates are as expected from previous literature: male, non-white, poor, limited 
English, special education, and students with low ACT all attempt fewer credits. Including many subject tests rather 
than the ACT composite produces nearly identical results, quantitatively and qualitatively. 
19 The null effect on full-time status also serves as a falsification check: given financial aid and other discontinuities 
at the full-time threshold, flat pricing should not induce many part-time students to enroll full-time. If we were to 
find an “effect” of flat pricing at this margin, we might be concerned about other unobserved, college-level attributes 
correlated with both flat pricing and students’ credit-taking behavior driving any other results. 
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or approximately one course.20 Students must earn 15 credits each semester in order to graduate 
within four years. However, the impact of flat pricing on earned credits is much weaker (i.e., half 
the magnitude or less of the effect on credits attempted), sometimes “wrong-signed,” and 
insignificant. Therefore, additional attempted credits do not appear to translate into more credits 
earned. 
The inability to translate attempted credits into earned ones is largely explained by course 
withdrawal. Table 3 examines effects on course withdrawal, failure, and performance (i.e., 
semester GPA) for all students and just full-time students. In a given semester, flat pricing 
increases the likelihood that students withdraw from at least one class by about 6 percentage 
points (p-value = 0.001) but has no impact on course failure. Since students at flat-pricing 
schools do not bear the financial cost of enrolling in a course and withdrawing after the drop 
deadline, they appear to do so much more frequently.21 Finally, flat pricing is also associated 
with a modest but measurable 0.05 point lower grade-point-average, on a base of 3.08 (p-value = 
0.01). In results not reported, we found that the additional courses students are induced to take in 
response to a subsidized marginal price are not substantively different than their typical courses 
and, if anything, are in the core subjects of Humanities/English and Social Science, seem to be 
degree-related, and that there is little systematic substitution from 3- to 4-credit courses.22 The 
effect on course performance suggests that students who have chosen larger credit loads may 
                                                 
20 We also used the re-weighting approach described by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) to construct 
counterfactuals of the entire distributions of credits attempted and earned, weighting students at per-credit schools to 
mirror the observable characteristics of students at flat-pricing institutions. This procedure produces very similar 
results: Marginal price has its largest effect on the likelihood of attempting up to 15 credits, but has a much more 
modest impact on the likelihood of earning credits. Furthermore, there are only small (and insignificant) differences 
in the distribution of credits attempted and earned by less-than-full-time students. These results are presented in 
Appendix C, Figure C3. 
21 Estimates from models that include UM-AA or do not control for institution-level ACT are similar. 
22 Results available from authors upon request. We characterize each course taken into one of 12 broad subject areas 
based on CIP codes (available at some institutions), academic department/subject, and/or course title. “Degree-
related” refers to CIP codes other than 31 through 37, which include Parks, Recreation, and Leisure Studies, Basic 
Skills/Remedial, Citizenship Activities, Health-related Knowledge and Skills, Interpersonal and Social Skills, 
Leisure and Recreational Activities, and Personal Awareness and Self-Improvement.  
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perform worse because of too heavy a credit load. Since effort is not observed, we cannot fully 
identify the channel through which course performance is affected – but it does not appear to 
happen through a shift in the types of courses taken. 
C. Robustness 
Table 4 examines the robustness of our main findings to various changes in sample, 
specification, and controls. Our full sample includes all college students enrolled in 2011-2012, 
including students that have chosen to persist beyond the first year. This may introduce sample 
selection bias if marginal price influences persistence. In addition, marginal pricing could have 
greater (or lesser) effects for lower-classmen as their course-taking would be less driven by 
graduation requirements. Yet, estimates focused on just freshmen (2011 high school graduates) 
are quite similar (column 2) to the full sample for all outcomes.23 
Having data on the full universe of students in public universities in the state permits us 
to control for individual characteristics quite flexibly. Estimates that include separate fixed 
effects for the large number of demographic groups defined by the six-way interaction of ACT 
score (each single point separately), female, race/ethnicity, FARM, LEP, and special education 
status (column 3) produces estimates that are nearly identical to our baseline specification.  
We address the possibility that students may choose to attend flat-pricing institutions 
based on unobservable student characteristics in two complementary ways. High school fixed 
effects absorb any high-school-specific peer, background, or resource differences that may 
correlate with college choice and schooling intensity. Such within-school comparisons (column 
4) are indistinguishable from the baseline specification. We also presents 2SLS estimates in 
which we instrument for flat pricing of institution attended with the pricing policy of the 
                                                 
23 As reported in Appendix Table A2, estimates are quite similar for each cohort separately. 
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university closest to a student’s high school. Point estimates are qualitatively similar, but smaller 
in magnitude than base model estimates and with much larger p-values due to imprecision.24 
Our base model controls for the midpoint of incoming students’ ACT scores, as this 
variable is more highly correlated with freshman retention rates than other measures we 
considered, was inferred to be the least noisy proxy for college quality (Black and Smith, 2006), 
and is used extensively in the college quality literature.25 Given the small number of institutions, 
we are limited to including only a few institution-level covariates due to multicollinearity issues. 
That said, columns 6 to 8 of Table 4 additionally control for other institutional characteristics to 
address the possibility that institutions with flat pricing differ along other dimensions that also 
influence course-taking. Controlling for instructional and student services spending (in addition 
to institution-level ACT score) weakens our main findings (column 6), but specifications with 
admissions rate or number of full-time faculty per student are quite similar to our preferred 
model. Furthermore, estimates that do not control for any institutional characteristics (columns 1 
and 4 in Table 2) are quite similar to these richer models.  
Finally, we examine robustness to two alternative specifications for our main explanatory 
variable. A $100 decrease in the marginal price of per additional credit is associated with a 2.2 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of attempting more than 12 credits, a 1.8 percentage 
point increase in likelihood of withdrawing from a class, and a reduction in term GPA of 0.016, 
but no change in credits earned. These magnitudes are comparable to our base model given that 
the average, additional per-credit price (for credits above 12) is $281 (e.g., 0.022*2.81 = 0.062). 
                                                 
24 The first-stage estimates are reported in Appendix Table A3. The first stage is of modest strength (F = 13.2), 
though the p-values reported for the 2SLS specifications are from cluster-robust standard errors that do not account 
for the small number of clusters. By way of comparison, these 2SLS standard errors are twice as large as those from 
the base model estimates (also without accounting for the small number of clusters).  
25 Black and Smith (2006) do not consider spending per student as proxy variables, though do consider faculty-
student ratios which are highly correlated with instructional spending per student. Appendix Table A4 reports 
correlations between different measures of institutional quality in our sample. ACT midpoint also tends to be 
positively associated with our outcomes, while results for other institutional characteristics are less consistent. 
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This specification fully exploits the variation in marginal price across institutions, including the 
modest marginal price ($80 per credit above 12) charged by the Flint and Dearborn campuses of 
the University of Michigan, which our base specification ignores by characterizing them as “flat” 
institutions. Finally, results are generally robust to directly coding the UM-Flint and UM-
Dearborn campuses as per-credit institutions, though estimated effects on credits earned are more 
positive in this specification. 
D. Heterogeneity  
Our theoretical framework suggests that students who would otherwise locate at the full-
time minimum of 12 credits would be most strongly affected by flat pricing. Such students 
experience only a substitution effect (non-school time has become more expensive) and are 
unambiguously predicted to increase their credit intensity. In fact, we should observe a “hole” in 
the density of students at the full-time minimum at flat-pricing schools if credit intensity were 
truly continuous. Since we cannot know the credit load that students at flat schools would choose 
when faced with linear pricing, we use students at per-credit schools with identical observed 
characteristics to form this counterfactual.  
We begin with our sample of full-time students (i.e., those attempting at least the full-
time minimum of 12 credits). We then create a large number of mutually exclusive student 
groups defined by the six-way interaction of ACT score (each single point separately), female, 
race/ethnicity, FARM, LEP, and special education status. Within each of these groups we 
compare the credits attempted (earned) between students at per-credit and flat-pricing schools. 
Figure 5 shows these results graphically.26 Groups are ordered according to the average number 
of credits attempted (earned) at per-credit institutions so that those farthest left are the groups 
                                                 
26 Figures are similar and the conclusions unchanged if we include part-time students in our sample for Figure 5. 
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most likely to attempt (earn) close the full-time minimum.27 The vertical distance provides an 
estimate of the effect of flat pricing for each group. These comparisons are among very similar 
students (e.g., among black non-special-education non-LEP females who were eligible for free or 
reduced-price meals and scored a 23 on the ACT).  
Consistent with the theory, we find estimated treatment effects on credits attempted are 
largest for students closest to the full-time minimum: students at flat schools attempt about one 
credit more, on average. Treatment effects diminish as we move up the distribution of average 
attempted credits. Effects on credits earned are even smaller and close to zero for all but the 
bottom third of groups. This suggests that our main results are indeed being driven by impacts on 
credits attempted for those students who would locate near the 12-credit threshold under a per-
credit pricing scheme. Students in the bottom 20 demographic subgroups in Figure 5 are 
overwhelmingly black (95%); 30% were eligible to receive free or reduced-price meals in high 
school. The typical student in this group had an ACT composite score of 17.5 and attempted 13.2 
credits. Students in the top 20 demographic subgroups are non-black, mostly female (80%) and 
non-FARM (only 5% FARM), scored an average of 25.6 on the ACT, and attempted an average 
of 14.6 credits. 28 
Rather than combine multiple sources of heterogeneity into one index, we also explored 
heterogeneity in our regression framework by explicitly contrasting effects by observable 
                                                 
27 The x-axis simply counts the number of student groups graphed where groups are ordered by the average credits 
taken in per-credit schools. Only groups containing at least 50 students in each type of school are shown in Figure 5, 
though the pattern is unchanged if more groups are included. 
28 In Appendix Table A5, we repeat our regression analysis separately by quintile of predicted credits attempted 
based on student characteristics with similar results. To construct quintiles we estimate a first-stage regression using 
data only on students at per-credit institutions where the outcome is credits attempted and the only covariates are 
student-level characteristics. We use coefficients from this model to predict the number of credits attempted for all 
students in our analytic sample and divide students in quintiles based on this prediction. Students in the bottom 
quintile are those closest to the 12-credit, full-time benchmark. Given recent concerns about the potential for this 
process to introduce systematic errors in the extremes of the prediction distribution, thereby biasing subgroup 
treatment effects (Abadie, Chingos, & West, 2013), we only include subgroups with more than 50 students per cell 
in Figure 5. In addition, our main sample sizes are quite large, mitigating bias-causing errors due to over-fitting in 
this prediction-based approach to exploring heterogeneity (Abadie, Chingos, & West, 2013, p. 4). 
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characteristics, such as sex and eligibility for free or reduced-price meals. This heterogeneity 
analysis was motivated by evidence of differential effects of other interventions for women 
versus men (e.g., Anderson, 2008), the overtaking of men by women in college entry and 
completion (Goldin, Katz, & Kuziemko, 2006), and the stronger response by low-income 
students to college prices relative to their more advantaged peers (Kane, 1994; Dynarski, 2002). 
These results (reported in Appendix Table A6) are largely consistent with the pattern depicted in 
Figure 5: effects of flat pricing remain concentrated along the margin of attempted (not earned) 
credits and withdrawal and are larger for low-income students. Though, in Table A6 there is 
suggestive evidence that a subset of FARM and female students may translate a small share of 
additional attempted credits into earned ones. These are likely to be high-achieving FARM and 
female students, given the results in Table A5 (wherein we see a slight increase in the effect of 
flat pricing on credits earned for students at the top of the distribution of predicted average 
credits attempted). Still, for these two subgroups, the coefficients on the likelihood of earning 
more than 12 credits are always half the magnitude (or less) of the corresponding coefficients on 
the likelihood of attempting more than 12 credits – mitigated by the consistent effect of flat 
pricing on course withdrawal. 
E. Long-term Outcomes 
We now explore the impact of marginal pricing on the longer-term outcomes of 
persistence and credit accumulation. We track entry into and persistence through postsecondary 
education using the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). For each member of the high school 
cohorts of 2008 through 2011, we identify students (of any intensity) that enrolled in a Michigan 
public 4-year university in the fall term immediately following high school graduation 
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(excluding the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor).29 Figure 6 plots the fraction of these students 
enrolled in any college (Panel A) or a MI public 4-year university (Panel B) over time, separately 
by the pricing policy of the first institution attended. Across all institutions, 96% of students 
attend any college (including Michigan universities, community colleges, and private colleges) 
in their second semester, though enrollment drops to 81% by the start of the fourth academic 
year. Comparable rates for enrollment at a Michigan public university are 93% and 70%, 
respectively. 
With the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor excluded, rates of persistence beyond the 
first year at any college or a Michigan public university appear slightly higher for students 
starting at institutions with per-credit (rather than flat) pricing practices.30 These raw persistence 
patterns do not control for the characteristics of students. When we control for such traits (Table 
5), these patterns remain largely unchanged, though smaller in magnitude. In no case do we find 
statistically significant differences in persistence patterns of students at flat-pricing colleges 
compared to their observationally identical counterparts who start at per-credit-pricing 
institutions, though coefficients are mostly small and always negative.  
We now directly examine impacts on credits accumulated over several years. Recall that 
STARR data contain information about all courses taken in 2011-2012 and in all prior terms, 
among students still enrolled in the 2011-2012 academic year. Thus for all students in the 2008, 
2009, and 2010 cohorts that persist to 2011-2012, we calculate cumulative credits attempted and 
earned as of Spring 2012. We make two important sample restrictions. First, we restrict our 
                                                 
29 Very few students enter one of these institutions in the spring term, so the fall enrollment restriction is not too 
binding. Students that delay entry into or eventually transfer to a Michigan public university from private or 
community colleges are also excluded to ensure that the sample is similar across cohorts, given that later cohorts 
would mechanically have few delayed or transfer entrants. 
30 Figure C4 in Appendix C plots persistence rates separately by cohort and pricing policy. Note that the persistence 
gap between per-credit and flat schools is almost entirely driven by the 2008 high school cohort. Gaps by pricing 
policy are minimal for the other cohorts.  
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analysis to students enrolled (at least part time) in any Michigan public 4-year college in all fall 
and spring semesters since high school graduation (as indicated by the NSC), excluding 
observations associated with the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor.31 This restriction permits us 
to abstract from students’ decisions to persist and instead focus on credits accumulated among 
those that have decided to persist in all periods.32 Second, we only keep students with complete 
consistency between their NSC and STARR records. 33 This restriction assures we accumulate all 
credits attempted and earned by an individual.34 
In Table 6 we analyze cumulative credits attempted, cumulative credits earned, and 
whether cumulative credits earned are above the threshold for on-time, all as of Spring 2012. 
Since these on-time thresholds differ by student level (sophomore, junior, senior), we present 
estimates separately by cohort. Overall, we find little evidence that flat pricing encourages 
students to attempt or accumulate more credits over time. On average, students have attempted 
59.0 credits and earned 54.5 by the end of their second year in college, but there is little 
difference between students at per-credit and flat-pricing institutions. Nor are students at flat 
institutions more likely to have earned 60 credits, a marker for graduating within four years.35 
Results for the 2009 and 2008 cohorts are qualitatively similar: the typical student is attempting 
and earning fewer credits than the on-time benchmark and there is minimal difference between 
students at flat and per-credit schools. Any modest average attempted credit advantage seen 
                                                 
31 So members of the high school class of 2008 (2009, 2010) must be enrolled in a MI public university for all 8 (6, 
4) fall and spring terms since high school graduation.  
32 Further, our intention is to construct markers of on-time credit accumulation that are only relevant for students 
that have already chosen to enroll. Given the minimal impact on persistence, we do not believe this restriction 
creates grave concerns about sample selection bias.  
33 Though NSC-STARR consistency is quite high in the 2011-2012 academic year (98%, similar for flat and per-
credit schools), it deteriorates in earlier years and becomes slightly worse at per-credit institutions. Thus results for 
the 2008 and 2009 cohorts that rely on historical data (such as cumulative credits) should be interpreted with some 
caution. 
34 We find similar effects on credits attempted in 2011-2012 with this restricted sample as with the full sample 
reported earlier. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
35 Though not reported in the table, we find similar results for cumulative credits across fall and spring terms only 
(excluding summer). 
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among students at flat pricing institutions is greatly reduced when looking at credits earned. 
These patterns of minimal impact of marginal price on cumulative credits attempted or earned 
and persistence are robust to various sample restrictions, methods for addressing non-random 
student sorting (group FEs, high school FEs), and controls for different institutional 
characteristics.36 
VII. Discussion and Conclusions 
Using rich administrative data on all in-state students at the 15 public universities in 
Michigan, this paper provides the first evidence on whether students’ educational investments 
respond to marginal price incentives. We find that a zero marginal price (above the full-time 
minimum) compels about 7 percent of students to attempt about one class more (i.e., up to 3 
additional credits). Yet, additional attempted credits do not appear to translate into more credits 
earned in a semester or cumulatively, greater persistence, or reduced time-to-degree, though 
estimates of these outcomes are admittedly less precise and more variable across specifications. 
This apparent wedge between credits attempted and earned is due to the increased propensity of 
students exposed to flat pricing to withdraw from classes. Further, flat pricing is associated with 
a small, but measurable and robust, 0.05 point reduction in semester GPA.  
Institutions have voiced divergent views about the likely effects of marginal price. Some 
have reduced the marginal price to zero in order to encourage students to “Finish in Four,” as 
Adam’s State’s plan is called. Others see per-credit pricing as an equitable way of generating 
revenue from students who consume more resources; in this vein “flat” pricing is viewed as a 
subsidy to students who would have taken large course loads anyway. Our findings support this 
latter interpretation, suggesting that increases in marginal price may be a non-distortionary way 
for institutions to raise revenue. Additional revenue could be used to finance other interventions 
                                                 
36 These results are reported in Appendix Table A7. 
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with a stronger track record of improving student success, to increase financial aid, or possibly to 
lower the average tuition price faced by students taking lower credit loads.  
Our finding that incremental pricing has minimal impacts on credit-taking and 
achievement stands in contrast to the rather large literature that documents substantial student 
responses to price in other choice environments, such as the decision to enroll in college. Yet, the 
postsecondary environment in which students encounter marginal prices differs in a number of 
ways from the setting in which students make choices about college-going. Our theoretical 
extensions describe various reasons why we might expect responses to marginal price to be 
muted in the context of higher education. Our results are consistent with the presence of 
substantial adjustment frictions, large or uncertain marginal effort costs, or large nonlinear 
returns to degrees. All of these would dampen the effects of marginal price on student course-
taking or cause the effects on attempted versus earned credits to diverge. Policies designed with 
large student price elasticities in mind (informed by the enrollment and college choice literature) 
may not translate well to the goal of supporting and hastening student progress with marginal 
incentives. 
Another explanation for the limited effects of marginal price on college outcomes is that 
marginal pricing policies may simply be less salient than the overall (average) price, which 
determines enrollment and college choice. In Michigan, we see some variation in the salience of 
pricing policies (and their relation to cost savings and time-to-degree) across institutions. For 
example, Lake Superior State University exclaims in large, bold font at the top of its webpage on 
costs: “LSSU offers a flat tuition rate for those taking 12 to 17 credits. This means you can take 
17 credit hours for the price of 12, a savings of over $4,100 per year, and over $16,400 in four 
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years!”37 Other colleges simply state the overall or per-credit tuition prices, sometimes buried in 
tables on registrar webpages. Lastly, students may respond to some other feature of price than 
marginal price, such as average or expected marginal price, as has been observed in other 
settings (Ito, 2013).  
Our study has several limitations that future work should address. Though our setting and 
analyses control for many possible confounders, we cannot entirely rule out differences in 
institutional characteristics as a source of bias. Examining the experience of institutions that have 
recently changed their marginal price is a promising strategy for addressing this type of bias. The 
main results also suggest a need to dig deeper into the choices students make after entering 
college to better understand the mechanisms at work. A task for future work is to separate 
competing explanations, possibly through an experimental information intervention along the 
lines of Chetty and Saez (2013). Finally, there are several other possible effects of marginal price 
we have not yet explored: major choice, financial burden, and interest exploration. These too are 
important questions for future research.  
 
                                                 
37 Source: http://www.lssu.edu/costs/  
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Figure 1. Sticker Price for Four Michigan Public Universities, Fall 2011 
First-time, in-state students in non-differentiated programs 
 
 
Source: Presidents Council, State Universities of Michigan, Report on Tuition and Fees 2011-2012. 
 
  
Figure 2. Single-Period School Intensity Budget Constraint 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure plots non-linear budget constraint (solid) for choice of school intensity if earnings increase linearly 
with intensity and per-credit tuition price is reduced (from  𝑡𝑡1 to 𝑡𝑡2) for intensity greater than z*. Linear budget 
constraint (dashed) is shown for reference. 
 
  
Figure 3. ACT Score Ranges at Michigan Public Universities, by Pricing Policy 
 
 
Source: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), data for 2009-2010 incoming class.  
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Figure 4. Fraction of Students at or above Credit Threshold at Michigan Public 
Universities 
 
A. Credits Attempted 
 
B. Credits Earned 
 
 
Notes: Figure plots the fraction of students at Michigan public universities that attempt (or earn) at least X credits in 
the semester, separately by the pricing structure of the university. Sample includes college-going Michigan high 
school graduates form the classes of 2008 through 2011. Credit-taking is observed in the fall and spring of the 2011-
2012 academic year.   
Figure 5. Heterogeneous Effects of Flat Pricing by Student Characteristics 
 
A. Credits Attempted 
 
B. Credits Earned 
 
Notes: Each demographic group is defined by a six-way interaction between ACT score, female, race/ethnicity, 
FARM, LEP, and special education status. Sample is limited to full-time students and excludes the University of 
Michigan-Ann Arbor. Only those groups containing at least 50 students are shown. Credit-taking is observed in the 
fall and spring of the 2011-2012 academic year. See text for additional details.  
Figure 6. Persistence Among Fall Enrollees at MI Public Universities, by Pricing Policy of 
First Institution Attended 
 
A. Persistence at Any College 
 
B. Persistence at Any MI Public 4-year University 
 
 
Notes: Figures plot the fraction of students enrolled in any college (Panel A) or a MI public university separately by 
pricing policy of first institution attended. Underlying sample is restricted to MI public high school graduates from 
2008 to 2011 that enrolled in a MI public 4-year university in the fall immediately after high school, excluding 
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 
Table 1. Student Sample Characteristics, by Marginal Pricing Practice
2008-2011 High School Graduates
Per-credit 
schools (PC)
Flat schools 
(F)
Difference 
(F - PC)
Flat schools 
(F)
Difference 
(F - PC)
A. Demographic and Achievement Characteristics
Female 0.554 0.549 -0.005 0.560 0.006
(0.497) (0.498) (0.002) (0.496) (0.002)
Black 0.118 0.074 -0.044 0.079 -0.039
(0.322) (0.261) (0.001) (0.269) (0.002)
Hispanic 0.016 0.021 0.005 0.022 0.006
(0.125) (0.142) (0.001) (0.146) (0.001)
Other 0.040 0.062 0.022 0.033 -0.007
(0.197) (0.241) (0.001) (0.180) (0.001)
White 0.826 0.843 0.018 0.866 0.040
(0.379) (0.363) (0.002) (0.340) (0.002)
FARM 0.069 0.058 -0.011 0.069 0.000
(0.254) (0.234) (0.001) (0.254) (0.001)
LEP 0.038 0.035 -0.003 0.028 -0.010
(0.191) (0.183) (0.001) (0.165) (0.001)
Special Education 0.066 0.063 -0.003 0.074 0.008
(0.248) (0.243) (0.001) (0.261) (0.001)
ACT composite (student) 22.096 23.612 1.514 21.909 -0.187
(4.193) (4.661) (0.020) (3.896) (0.020)
B. College Characteristics (enrollment-weighted)
In-state tuition and fees (sticker price) 10,682 10,592 -89 9,408 -1,274
(1,663) (1,873) (8) (444) (7)
Instructional spending per FTE 9,699 11,153 1,454 7,153 -2,546
(3,022) (6,254) (20) (988) (13)
Student services spending per FTE 1,135 1,510 375 1,311 176
(435) (340) (2) (170) (2)
Full-time faculty per 100 FTE 5.009 7.338 2.329 4.478 -0.532
(1.524) (4.447) (0.013) (0.407) (0.006)
Admissions rate 0.729 0.677 -0.052 0.789 0.061
(0.058) (0.187) (0.001) (0.081) 0.000
ACT composite (institution) 22.983 24.954 1.971 22.854 -0.129
(1.935) (3.294) (0.011) (0.594) (0.008)
C. College Outcomes
Credits Attempted 13.752 14.399 0.779 14.058 0.306
(2.821) (2.778) (0.012) (2.639) (0.014)
Credits Earned 12.491 13.274 0.787 12.588 0.097
(3.808) (3.883) (0.017) (3.935) (0.019)
Attempt at least 12 credits 0.904 0.937 0.036 0.925 0.021 
(0.295) (0.242) (0.001) (0.263) (0.001)
Earn at least 12 credits 0.769 0.814 0.029 0.762 -0.008
(0.421) (0.389) (0.002) (0.426) (0.002)
Attempt more than 12 credits 0.688 0.803 0.121 0.773 0.085
(0.463) (0.398) (0.002) (0.419) (0.002)
Earn more than 12 credits 0.574 0.674 0.091 0.607 0.033
(0.494) (0.469) (0.002) (0.488) (0.002)
Attempt 15 or more credits 0.391 0.513 0.135 0.469 0.078
(0.488) (0.500) (0.002) (0.499) (0.002)
Earn 15 or more credits 0.316 0.421 0.111 0.354 0.038
(0.465) (0.494) (0.002) (0.478) (0.002)
Withdraw from at least one class 0.091 0.128 0.036 0.152 0.061
(0.288) (0.334) (0.001) (0.359) (0.002)
Fail at least one class 0.131 0.111 -0.020 0.130 -0.001
(0.337) (0.315) (0.001) (0.336) (0.002)
Term GPA 2.942 2.978 0.036 2.880 -0.062
(0.919) (0.878) (0.004) (0.887) (0.005)
N 128,736 83,737 -- 59,124 --
Include all flat schools Exclude UM-Ann Arbor
Notes: Each observation is a student-by-semester, so most students are included twice. Sample includes all students during the 2011-2012 
academic year. The "other" race category includes students who identify as American Indian, Asian American, Hawaiian, or Multi-racial. Data on 
institutions come from the 2011-2012 academic year and all financial variables are expressed in nominal dollars. Means for college 
characteristics are enrollment-weighted. Standard deviations (errors for difference) appear in parentheses. Standard errors for differences in 
average institutional characteristics by pricing policy are based on a total sample size of 15 institutions.
Table 2. Marginal Tuition Pricing and College Credits Attempted and Earned
Individual controls, excluding UM-Ann Arbor
Outcome mean (1) (2) mean (3) mean (4) (5) mean (6)
Average credits 14.41 0.194 0.181 13.85 0.271 13.10 -0.033 -0.011 12.52 0.071
[0.664] [0.708] [0.616] [0.848] [0.964] [0.956]
12 or more credits 0.91 0.021 0.77 -0.009
[0.508] [0.736]
13 or more credits 0.79 0.072** 0.074** 0.72 0.082 0.64 0.020 0.025 0.59 0.032
[0.040] [0.032] [0.188] [0.632] [0.280] [0.476]
15 or more credits 0.46 0.071 0.068 0.42 0.070 0.36 0.031 0.030 0.33 0.033
[0.348] [0.388] [0.384] [0.488] [0.528] [0.48]
Institution controls None ACT composite
ACT 
composite None
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on indicator for "flat pricing" from a separate regression. All observations associated with the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor are excluded from 
the analytic sample. All models include indicators for each unique term (e.g., Fall 2011) and high school cohort; indicators for female, black, Hispanic, other race, LEP and FARM, as well 
as composite ACT score. "All students" sample includes all in-state students enrolled in a Michigan public university in the 2011-2012 academic year, resulting in 187,853 student-term 
observations. "Full-time students" sample includes 171,058 student-term observations with at least 12 attempted credits. P-values calculated using the wild bootstrap approach (with 500 
repetitions) recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) for few clusters appear in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Credits Attempted Credits Earned
Full-time Students All Students All StudentsFull-time Students
Table 3. Marginal Tuition Pricing and Course Performance
Individual controls, institution-level ACT, excluding UM-Ann Arbor
All Students Full-time Students
(1) (2)
Panel A. Outcome = Withdrew from at least one class
Flat pricing 0.058* 0.059***
[0.084] [0.001]
Outcome mean 0.110 0.109
Panel B. Outcome = Failed at least one class
Flat pricing 0.001 0.004
[0.896] [0.772]
Outcome mean 0.131 0.122
Panel C. Outcome = Term GPA
Flat pricing -0.050 -0.054**
[0.216] [0.012]
Outcome mean 3.052 3.077
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on indicator for "flat pricing" from a separate 
regression. All observations associated with the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor are 
excluded from the analytic sample. All models include indicators for each unique term 
(e.g., Fall 2011) and high school cohort; indicators for female, black, Hispanic, other 
race, LEP and FARM, as well as composite ACT score; and institution-level ACT 
midpoint. "All students" sample includes all in-state students enrolled in a Michigan 
public university in the 2011-2012 academic year, resulting in a maximum of 187,853 
student-term observations. "Full-time students" sample includes a maximum of 171,058 
student-term observations with at least 12 credits attempted. P-values calculated using 
the wild bootstrap approach (with 500 repetitions) recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, 
and Miller (2008) for few clusters appear in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table 4. Robustness of Main Results
Full-time students, excluding UM-Ann Arbor
Base model 2011 Cohort only Group FEs HS FEs 2SLS
Instructional 
and student 
services 
spending per 
FTE
Admissions 
rate
Number of 
full-time 
faculty per 
FTE
Marginal 
price in 
dollars 
(rather than 
indicator)
Categorize 
UM-D and 
UM-F as per-
credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. Credits Attempted
Average credits attempted 0.181 0.240 0.171 0.149 -0.081 -0.171 0.278 0.068 -0.030 0.372
[0.708] [0.560] [0.648] [0.682] [0.820] [0.812] [0.488] [0.880] [0.884] [0.432]
13 or more credits attempted 0.074** 0.083** 0.073** 0.072** 0.048 0.053 0.054* 0.070 -0.022* 0.104***
[0.032] [0.016] [0.044] [0.036] [0.419] [0.316] [0.100] [0.120] [0.060] [0.000]
15 or more credits attempted 0.068 0.042 0.066 0.061 0.010 -0.024 0.083 0.046 -0.017 0.120
[0.388] [0.544] [0.342] [0.348] [0.891] [0.864] [0.364] [0.512] [0.584] [0.104]
Panel B. Credits Earned
Average credits earned -0.011 0.057 -0.023 -0.028 -0.239 -0.234 0.007 -0.088 0.018 0.126
[0.964] [0.804] [0.898] [0.873] [0.282] [0.208] [0.984] [0.636] [0.820] [0.628]
13 or more credits earned 0.025 0.039 0.023 0.024 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.022 -0.008 0.046*
[0.280] [0.360] [0.259] [0.239] [0.824] [0.588] [0.752] [0.368] [0.300] [0.068]
15 or more credits earned 0.030 0.011 0.028 0.025 -0.011 -0.036 0.038 0.016 -0.007 0.068
[0.528] [0.800] [0.514] [0.529] [0.828] [0.496] [0.524] [0.700] [0.652] [0.132]
Panel C. Course Performance
Withdrew from at least one course 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.044 0.042* 0.058** 0.059*** -0.018*** 0.074***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.113] [0.076] [0.012] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000]
Failed at least one course 0.004 -0.005 0.005 0.003 0.013 -0.003 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.003
[0.772] [0.856] [0.726] [0.855] [0.396] [0.900] [0.768] [0.760] [0.812] [0.792]
Term GPA -0.054** -0.045 -0.055*** -0.050*** -0.073** -0.023 -0.050** -0.051** 0.016** -0.055**
[0.012] [0.204] [0.008] [0.009] [0.028] [0.172] [0.016] [0.016] [0.020] [0.012]
Student controls? Linear Linear Group fixed effects
Linear plus 
HS fixed 
effects
Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Institution controls? ACT composite
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite 
plus spending 
controls
ACT 
composite 
plus 
selectivity 
control
ACT 
composite 
plus faculty 
resource 
control
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite
Price structureInstitutional characteristics
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on indicator for "flat pricing" from a separate regression. Column (9) is the exception: it reports the coefficient on a continuous measure of marginal price denominated in 100-dollar increments (2011-
2012 dollars). All observations associated with the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor are excluded from the analytic sample. All models include indicators for each unique term (e.g., Fall 2011) and high school cohort; indicators for female, 
black, Hispanic, other race, LEP and FARM, as well as composite ACT score. Sample sizes for columns (2) and (3) are 46,414 and 80,310 respectively. All other specifications have a maximum sample size of 171,058. Except for columns (3), 
(4), and (5), in which p-values are based on standard errors clustered by college, p-values calculated using the wild bootstrap approach (with 500 repetitions) recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) for few clusters appear in 
brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Student sorting
Table 5. Marginal Tuition Pricing and College Persistence, First-time Fall Enrollees at MI Public Universities
Individual controls, institution-level ACT, excluding UM-Ann Arbor
mean (1) mean (2)
Enrolled 1st Spring 0.960 -0.005 0.931 -0.006
 (max n = 103,362) [0.712] [0.676]
Enrolled 2nd Fall 0.914 -0.012 0.819 -0.023
 (max n = 77,543) [0.488] [0.280]
Enrolled 2nd Spring 0.885 -0.011 0.774 -0.009
[0.592] [0.724]
Enrolled 3rd Fall 0.855 -0.015 0.735 -0.015
 (max n = 51,653) [0.468] [0.504]
Enrolled 3rd Spring 0.833 -0.017 0.711 -0.010
[0.460] [0.688]
Enrolled 4th Fall 0.810 -0.020 0.695 -0.015
 (max n = 26,205) [0.400] [0.532]
Enrolled 4th Spring 0.764 -0.057 0.652 -0.050
[0.252] [0.312]
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on indicator for "flat pricing" at first institution attended from a separate regression. 
Sample is restricted to MI public high school graduates from 2008 to 2011 that enrolled in a MI public university in the fall 
immediately after high school graduation, excluding University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. All models include cohort fixed 
effects and ACT composite score of first institution attended. Individual controls include dummies for female, black, Hispanic, 
other race, LEP, and FARM, and composite ACT score. P-values calculated using the wild bootstrap approach (with 500 
repetitions) recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) for few clusters appear in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Outcome = Enrolled in MI Public 
4-Year CollegeOutcome = Enrolled in Any College
Table 6. Marginal Tuition Pricing and Cumulative College Credits Attempted and Earned as of Winter 2012
Individual controls, institution-level ACT, excluding UM-Ann Arbor
Cumulative 
credits 
attempted
Cumulative 
credits earned
"On-time" 
cumulative 
credits earned
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. High school class of 2010 
"On-time" = 60 credits earned by Winter 2012, n = 17,447 students
Flat pricing 0.625 0.279 -0.001
[0.788] [0.876] [0.928]
Outcome mean 59.01 54.45 0.30
Panel B. High school class of 2009 
"On-time" = 90 credits earned by Winter 2012, n = 13,574 students
Flat pricing 0.995 0.327 -0.028
[0.780] [0.864] [0.572]
Outcome mean 89.63 83.46 0.35
Panel C. High school class of 2008 
"On-time" = 120 credits earned by Winter 2012, n = 9,913 students
Flat pricing 2.306 1.011 0.007
[0.628] [0.720] [0.940]
Outcome mean 119.82 111.79 0.36
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on indicator for "flat pricing" from a separate regression. Sample is restricted to students 
enrolled (part-time or full-time) in all fall and winter semesters since high school graduation and for which NSC and STARR 
data agree on enrollment history. Cumulative credits include credits taken during summer terms. All models include dummies for 
female, black, Hispanic, other race, LEP and FARM and composite ACT score of individual, midpoint ACT of the institution, 
and exclude University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. P-values calculated using the wild bootstrap approach (with 500 repetitions) 
recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) for few clusters appear in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix A. Additional Tables 
(Referenced in Main Text) 
 
Table A1. Marginal Pricing Practices at Michigan’s 4-year Public Universities 
 
Table A2. Cohort-specific Estimates 
 
Table A3. First-Stage Estimates for 2SLS Approach 
 
Table A4. Correlations between Institutional Characteristics 
 
Table A5. Effects by Quintile of Predicted Credits Attempted 
 
Table A6. Effects by Student Gender and Poverty Status 
 
Table A7. Robustness of Cumulative Credits and Persistence 
 
Withdrawal Policy
Type Per-credit price (2011/2012) Flat range
Level 
(upper vs. lower)
Program or 
school
Can receive full (or near full) refund 
of tuition and fees if withdraw by…
Central Michigan University per credit $358 second meeting of course
Eastern Michigan University per credit $247 one week into course
Ferris State University per credit $348 fourth day of the semester
Grand Valley State University flat 12-16 credits yes end of first week of classes
Lake Superior State University flat 12-17 credits sixth day of the semester
Michigan State University per credit $407 yes yes one-fourth of term of the class*
Michigan Technological University per credit $421 second Wednesday of semester
Northern Michigan University flat 12-18 credit one week into course
Oakland University per credit $331 yes two weeks into course
Saginaw Valley State University per credit $246 end of first week of classes
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor flat 12-18 credits yes yes three weeks into course
University of Michigan-Dearborn flat > 12 two weeks into course
University of Michigan-Flint flat > 12 three weeks into course
Wayne State University per credit $287 yes yes two weeks into course
Western Michigan University flat 12-15 credits yes one week into course
Source: Presidents Council, State Universities of Michigan, Report on Tuition and Fees 2011-2012
Price differentials by…
Table A1. Marginal Pricing Practices at Michigan's 4-year Public Universities
Notes: UM-Dearborn and UM-Flint charge $80 for each credit above 12, though this is substantially lower than the rate charged per credit up to 12. Withdrawal and refund policies come directly 
from each institution's registrar, business, and/or records websites. * = measured in weekdays not class days.
TableA2. Cohort-specific Estimates
Full-time students, individual controls, institution-level ACT, excluding UM-Ann Arbor
All cohorts 2011 Cohort only
2010 Cohort 
only
2009 Cohort 
only
2008 Cohort 
only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Credits Attempted
Average credits attempted 0.181 0.240 0.043 0.215 0.225
[0.708] [0.560] [0.948] [0.724] [0.696]
13 or more credits attempted 0.074** 0.083** 0.067* 0.078** 0.068
[0.032] [0.016] [0.056] [0.024] [0.144]
15 or more credits attempted 0.068 0.042 0.050 0.097 0.086
[0.388] [0.544] [0.572] [0.228] [0.312]
Panel B. Credits Earned
Average credits earned -0.011 0.057 -0.134 0.006 0.027
[0.964] [0.804] [0.572] [0.984] [0.936]
13 or more credits earned 0.025 0.039 0.014 0.025 0.022
[0.280] [0.360] [0.728] [0.252] [0.456]
15 or more credits earned 0.030 0.011 0.012 0.049 0.051
[0.528] [0.800] [0.844] [0.364] [0.336]
Panel C. Course Performance
Withdrew from at least one course 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.064***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Failed at least one course 0.004 -0.005 0.002 0.007 0.011*
[0.772] [0.856] [0.884] [0.488] [0.068]
Term GPA -0.054** -0.045 -0.066** -0.056** -0.049
[0.012] [0.204] [0.036] [0.036] [0.120]
Sample size          171,058         46,414         41,855         42,253         40,536 
Student controls? Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Institution controls? ACT composite
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite
Separately by Cohort
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on indicator for "flat pricing" from a separate regression. All observations associated with the 
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor are excluded from the analytic sample. All models include indicators for each unique term (e.g., 
Fall 2011) and high school cohort; indicators for female, black, Hispanic, other race, LEP and FARM, as well as composite ACT 
score. P-values calculated using the wild bootstrap approach (with 500 repetitions) recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 
(2008) for few clusters appear in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A3. First-Stage Results for 2SLS Approach 
Outcome = Current 
institution has flat 
pricing
Independent variable (1)
Flat pricing (closest institution) 0.210
(0.057)***
Student-level covariates Yes
High school cohort indicators Yes
Semester indicators Yes
R-squared 0.059
N 170,963
Notes: 2SLS = two-stage least squares; Sample is limited to full-time 
students. This first-stage underpins estimates from Table 4, column 5 
in main text. Robust standard errors clustered by college appear in 
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A4. Correlations between Institutional Characteristics
ACT 
midpoint
FT faculty 
per FTE
Instructional 
spending per 
FTE
Student 
services 
spending per 
FTE
Admissions 
rate
A. All 15 institutions (unweighted)
ACT midpoint 1.00
FT faculty per FTE 0.84 1.00
Instructional spending per FTE 0.82 0.93 1.00
Student services spending per FTE 0.31 0.54 0.37 1.00
Admissions rate -0.63 -0.64 -0.70 -0.44 1.00
FT student retention rate 0.88 0.77 0.85 0.26 -0.65
B. Excluding UM-AA (unweighted)
ACT midpoint 1.00
FT faculty per FTE 0.53 1.00
Instructional spending per FTE 0.49 0.78 1.00
Student services spending per FTE -0.04 0.40 0.07 1.00
Admissions rate -0.15 -0.06 -0.30 -0.23 1.00
FT student retention rate 0.78 0.54 0.72 -0.01 -0.34
C. Excluding UM-AA (weighted by enrollment)
ACT midpoint 1.00
FT faculty per FTE 0.33 1.00
Instructional spending per FTE 0.55 0.78 1.00
Student services spending per FTE -0.49 0.20 -0.18 1.00
Admissions rate -0.02 0.05 -0.18 -0.12 1.00
FT student retention rate 0.87 0.47 0.75 -0.37 -0.14
Notes: Table reports pair-wise correlation coefficients between institution-level characteristics. Includes 14 4-year public 
institutions in Michigan (15 in panel A).
Table A5. Effects by Quintile of Predicted Credits Attempted
Full-time students, individual controls, institution-level ACT, excluding UM-Ann Arbor
1 (low) 2 3 4 5 (high)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Credits Attempted
Average credits attempted 0.383 0.084 0.076 0.060 0.122
[0.312] [0.936] [0.960] [0.984] [0.824]
13 or more credits attempted 0.122** 0.062 0.055 0.056 0.052**
[0.044] [0.148] [0.168] [0.128] [0.020]
15 or more credits attempted 0.106 0.043 0.041 0.057 0.057
[0.188] [0.700] [0.644] [0.508] [0.348]
Panel B. Credits Earned
Average credits earned 0.036 -0.189 -0.115 -0.024 0.069
[0.832] [0.452] [0.572] [0.884] [0.836]
13 or more credits earned 0.038 0.011 0.010 0.026 0.027**
[0.100] [0.704] [0.700] [0.280] [0.044]
15 or more credits earned 0.041 0.010 0.012 0.032 0.037
[0.340] [0.900] [0.860] [0.556] [0.320]
Panel C. Withdrawal or Fail
Withdrew from at least one course 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.054***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Failed at least one course 0.007 0.012 0.010 0.002 -0.019
[0.664] [0.544] [0.528] [0.848] [0.500]
Term GPA -0.028 -0.078** -0.086*** -0.064** -0.013
[0.244] [0.032] [0.004] [0.024] [0.664]
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on indicator for "flat pricing" from a separate regression. Students are grouped into quintiles based on 
their predicted number of credits attempted from a regression model applied to students at per-credit schools. All models include dummies for 
unique cohort and term, dummies for female, black, Hispanic, other race, LEP and FARM and composite ACT score of individual, midpoint 
ACT of the institution, and exclude UM-Ann Arbor. P-values calculated using the wild bootstrap approach (with 500 repetitions) 
recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) for few clusters appear in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Quintile of Predicted Credits Attempted
Table A6. Effects by Student Gender and Poverty Status
Full-time students, individual controls, institution-level ACT, excluding UM-Ann Arbor
Female Male Non-FARM FARM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Credits Attempted
Average credits attempted 0.183 0.182 0.160 0.404
[0.812] [0.680] [0.800] [0.256]
13 or more credits attempted 0.079* 0.069* 0.070* 0.127**
[0.064] [0.084] [0.068] [0.016]
15 or more credits attempted 0.077 0.057 0.064 0.109
[0.416] [0.460] [0.468] [0.132]
Panel B. Credits Earned
Average credits earned 0.101 -0.142 -0.023 0.083
[0.768] [0.424] [0.864] [0.624]
13 or more credits earned 0.040* 0.007 0.023 0.048**
[0.084] [0.816] [0.340] [0.016]
15 or more credits earned 0.042 0.016 0.028 0.044
[0.456] [0.748] [0.580] [0.296]
Panel C. Withdrawal or Fail
Withdrew from at least one course 0.054*** 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.070***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Failed at least one course -0.004 0.013 0.003 0.007
[0.644] [0.552] [0.828] [0.620]
Term GPA -0.033 -0.077** -0.053** -0.057**
[0.304] [0.012] [0.020] [0.048]
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on indicator for "flat pricing" from a separate regression. All models include 
dummies for unique cohort and term, dummies for female, black, Hispanic, other race, LEP and FARM and composite 
ACT score of individual, midpoint ACT of the institution, and exclude UM-Ann Arbor. P-values calculated using the 
wild bootstrap approach (with 500 repetitions) recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) for few clusters 
appear in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A7. Robustness of Cumulative Credits and Persistence
Base model Group FEs HS FEs
Instructional 
and student 
services 
spending per 
FTE
Admissions 
rate
Number of 
full-time 
faculty per 
FTE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. High school class of 2010 
Cumulative credits attempted 0.625 0.492 0.395 -0.747 0.642 0.014
[0.788] [0.772] [0.790] [0.776] [0.788] [0.952]
Cumulative credits earned 0.279 0.150 0.056 -1.030 0.135 -0.155
[0.876] [0.872] [0.932] [0.468] [0.964] [0.784]
Panel B. High school class of 2009 
Cumulative credits attempted 0.995 0.805 0.642 -0.483 0.753 0.016
[0.780] [0.737] [0.743] [0.868] [0.772] [0.960]
Cumulative credits earned 0.327 0.137 0.072 -1.471 -0.087 -0.553
[0.864] [0.916] [0.934] [0.476] [0.924] [0.544]
Panel C. High school class of 2008 
Cumulative credits attempted 2.306 2.172 2.012 1.220 1.379 1.260
[0.628] [0.537] [0.523] [0.856] [0.680] [0.764]
Cumulative credits earned 1.011 0.851 0.828 -0.220 -0.053 0.138
[0.720] [0.708] [0.645] [0.956] [0.968] [0.972]
Panel D. Persistence at any college (all cohorts) 
Enrolled 1st Spring -0.005 -0.005 -0.000 -0.003 -0.010 -0.006
[0.712] [0.631] [0.992] [0.708] [0.528] [0.656]
Enrolled 2nd Fall -0.012 -0.013 -0.002 -0.003 -0.010 -0.015
[0.488] [0.410] [0.850] [0.824] [0.640] [0.432]
Enrolled 2nd Spring -0.011 -0.012 0.001 -0.007 -0.011 -0.014
[0.592] [0.514] [0.940] [0.628] [0.596] [0.512]
Enrolled 3rd Fall -0.015 -0.017 -0.002 -0.010 -0.014 -0.021
[0.468] [0.389] [0.885] [0.616] [0.524] [0.360]
Enrolled 3rd Spring -0.017 -0.019 -0.003 -0.017 -0.017 -0.023
[0.460] [0.363] [0.877] [0.388] [0.508] [0.360]
Enrolled 4th Fall -0.020 -0.022 -0.003 -0.016 -0.022 -0.026
[0.400] [0.288] [0.881] [0.444] [0.392] [0.288]
Enrolled 4th Spring -0.057 -0.061* -0.043 -0.050 -0.050 -0.065
[0.252] [0.067] [0.138] [0.348] [0.248] [0.224]
Student controls? Linear Group fixed effects
Linear plus 
HS fixed 
effects
Linear Linear Linear
Institution controls? ACT composite
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite
ACT 
composite 
plus spending 
controls
ACT 
composite 
plus 
selectivity 
control
ACT 
composite 
plus faculty 
resource 
control
Institutional characteristics
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on indicator for "flat pricing"  from a separate regression. For the cumulative credits outcomes, the sample is restricted to students 
enrolled (part-time or full-time) in all fall and winter semesters since high school graduation and for which NSC and STARR data agree on enrollment history. Cumulative 
credits include credits taken during summer terms. For the persistence outcomes, "Flat Pricing" describes the pricing policy of the first institution attended and  the sample is 
restricted to MI public high school graduates from 2008 to 2011 that enrolled in a MI public university in the fall immediately after high school graduation. All observations 
associated with the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor are excluded from the analytic samples. All models include indicators for term (if outcome is measure of cumulative 
credits) or high school cohort (if outcome is measures of persistence); indicators for female, black, Hispanic, other race, LEP and FARM, as well as composite ACT score. 
Except for columns (2) and (3), in which p-values are based on standard errors clustered by college, p-values calculated using the wild bootstrap approach (with 500 
repetitions) recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) for few clusters appear in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Student sorting
Appendix B: Extensions to Basic Static Model 
The basic model described in the text omits four potentially important features of 
postsecondary schooling: investment over time, nonlinear returns, uncertainty, and investment 
“lumpiness.” This Appendix develops the implications of these features. 
Investment over time. Extending the analysis to more than one period, by itself, has little 
impact on our qualitative predictions. Suppose earnings are linear in total credits accumulated 
over multiple periods. If pricing is also linear, then the well-known consumption smoothing 
result prevails; students will choose the same credit load in each period. However, the 
introduction of nonlinear pricing separately in each period means that three possible outcomes 
satisfy the first-order conditions. Some students will choose equal credit loads across all periods 
at zlow, below full-time status (on the lower segment of the budget constraint). Others will choose 
equal credit loads across all periods at zhigh, above full-time status. Some may also find it optimal 
to choose zhigh in one period and zlow in another if this switching equilibrium dominates either of 
the constant ones. That is, utility may be maximized by exerting the extra effort cost and 
achieving the higher marginal return for one (but not all) periods.1 As with the one-period model, 
switching from a linear to flat pricing schedule will have the greatest impact on credits taken (in 
either period) for those who would otherwise locate at the full-time minimum. 
Nonlinear returns. Perhaps the most controversial simplification of the basic model 
described in the main text is that it assumed each course credit increases lifetime earnings by the 
same increment. This simplification permitted us to focus on the nonlinearities created by tuition 
policies. However, there is evidence that the return to college education is nonlinear due to 
strong “sheepskin” effects. The final credit earned to complete a degree has a much higher return 
                                                 
1 A switching optimum with z1 = zlow and z2 = zhigh will satisfy the FOC as long as 
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. Whether this 
dominates the constant-credit outcomes depends on the utility function. 
than the first few credits earned toward the same degree. First consider a one-period model 
where each increment of schooling increases earning potential by a fixed amount w up to a 
threshold level 𝑧𝑧̅, at which point earnings jump by a discrete amount 𝜃𝜃 and are constant 
thereafter. Thus 𝐸𝐸(𝑧𝑧) = (𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧) ∙ 1(𝑧𝑧 < 𝑧𝑧̅) + (𝑤𝑤𝑧𝑧̅+ 𝜃𝜃) ∙ 1(𝑧𝑧 ≥ 𝑧𝑧̅). In this case, the nonlinear 
return will dominate intensity decisions. Students will bunch precisely at the 𝑧𝑧̅ since it will never 
be optimal to choose a level z > 𝑧𝑧̅ .2 Thus many students (who otherwise choose enough credits 
to achieve the nonlinear return) will be unaffected by a shift from linear to flat pricing. However, 
the shift will draw more people into the return kink, inducing them to acquire the degree. Again, 
those on the margin of graduating should be most affected by this marginal price change. This 
same logic applies to the setting with multiple time periods, nonlinear returns, and no 
uncertainty. Since credits earned in different time periods are perfect substitutes in the earnings 
production function, students’ choice problem is similar in all periods. Thus decisions will be 
similarly sensitive to marginal price in earlier or later time periods.  
Uncertainty. The model assumes that people choose credit loads with perfect foresight 
about future preferences (e.g., effort costs), credit completion, enrollment, and degree 
completion. Uncertainty along these dimensions alters the choice environment as it is resolved 
over time. For instance, freshmen may be uncertain about future life events that may cause them 
to drop out, enroll part-time, or otherwise switch budget constraint segments next year. Since the 
payoffs to current decisions depend, in part, on these uncertain future outcomes, current choices 
will be less responsive to price when uncertainty is greatest, such as in the earliest years. 
Students in later years of college, facing less uncertainty, should respond more sharply to 
changes in price schedule. 
                                                 
2 If we permit additional credits beyond 𝑧𝑧̅ to increase earnings, some students will locate at 𝑧𝑧 > 𝑧𝑧̅, but there will still 
be a mass of students at 𝑧𝑧̅. 
Investment lumpiness. Lastly, the above discussion treats schooling intensity as 
continuous, though in practice the number of credits is finite and “lumpy” as most classes are 
worth either 3 or 4 credits. Such adjustment costs have been found to mute responses to 
nonlinear incentives in other contexts (Chetty et al., 2011).  
  
Appendix C: Additional Figures  
Figure C1. Likelihood of Attending a Flat-Pricing Institution, Exclude UM-AA 
 
Notes: Graphs depict distributions of predicted probabilities from a probit model of attending a flat-pricing 
institution by school type (i.e., flat or per-credit) as a function of student-level characteristics. Sample 
includes all students (regardless of enrollment intensity). 
 
  
Figure C2. Likelihood of Attending a Flat-Pricing Institution, Include UM-AA 
 
Notes: Graphs depict distributions of predicted probabilities from a probit model of attending a flat-pricing 
institution by school type (i.e., flat or per-credit) as a function of student-level characteristics. Sample 
includes all students (regardless of enrollment intensity). 
 
  
Figure C3. DFL-Reweighted Estimates of Flat-Pricing Effects 
 
A. Credits Attempted 
 
 
B. Credits Earned 
 
Notes: Figures plot the difference in distributions of credits attempted and earned, weighting students at per-credit 
schools to mirror the observable characteristics of students at flat-pricing institutions as described by DiNardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996). 95% confidence intervals are constructed using 500 bootstrapped replications, re-
sampling entire institutions to account for the within-institution correlation of outcomes. 
Figure C4. Persistence Among Fall Enrollees at MI Public Universities, by High School 
Cohort and Pricing Policy 
 
A. Persistence at Any College 
 
B. Persistence at Any MI Public 4-year University 
 
 
Notes: Figures plot the fraction of students enrolled in any college (Panel A) or a MI public university separately by 
high school cohort and pricing policy of first institution. Underlying sample is restricted to MI public high school 
graduates from 2008 to 2011 that enrolled in a MI public 4-year university in the fall immediately after high school, 
excluding University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. 
 
 
Appendix D: External Validity 
Our study focuses on public universities in Michigan because of the availability of rich 
transcript data and because the state appears unique in having substantial policy variation among 
similar institutions, likely because tuition policy is not set centrally. While focusing on a single 
state and sector controls for many possible confounders, it raises the question of external 
validity. Unfortunately there is no systematic source of information of the current use of flat or 
per-credit pricing across many institutions nationally, so repeating our analysis for a wide range 
of schools is not possible.3 As a check on external validity, in Table D1 we examine students at 
public universities in the states of Minnesota and Texas using data contained in the 2004 and 
2008 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS). These states have nationally 
representative samples for students in public universities in both these years and, importantly, 
have some variation in pricing practices across institutions and over time.4  
Within the University of Minnesota System, the Duluth and Crookston campuses 
transitioned from per-credit to flat pricing between 2004 and 2008, while the Twin Cities and 
Morris campuses were flat throughout. Three of the Minnesota State Universities had flat pricing 
and four had per-credit pricing in 2004, with one (Southwest State) going from per credit to flat 
between 2004 and 2008. Though cross-sectional models suggest a positive association between 
flat pricing and credit intensity, including institution fixed effects eliminates this pattern. Though 
the Duluth and Crookston campuses adopted flat pricing, their students did not gain on those at 
                                                 
3 Standard sources such as the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) by the U.S. Department of 
Education and the Annual Survey of Colleges by the College Board ask institutions to report the price for a typical 
full-time student, but do not currently report whether this price varies with credit load. This is a point also made by 
Baum et al (2013). IPEDS does contain an indicator for flat or per-credit pricing in 1993, but data from this period 
would have limited applicability to the external validity of our results in 2011. 
4 Other states with representative or large samples in NPSAS in 2004 and 2008 lack adequate variation in pricing 
practices across institutions. For instance, all public 4-year universities in California, New York, Ohio, and North 
Carolina have flat pricing structures, as do most in Georgia. Flat pricing in Illinois is confined to the two most 
selective institutions (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and University of Illinois Chicago) with no change, 
making credible comparisons difficult. All public universities in Florida charge per credit hour.  
the Twin Cities and Morris campuses where pricing policy was unchanged.5 In Texas, flat 
pricing was introduced at five campuses in the wake of tuition deregulation in 2003 (Kim and 
Stange, 2015): the University of North Texas (2007), UT Austin (2005), UT Arlington (2006), 
UT Brownsville (2006), and Texas A&M (2009). Prior to that, all institutions charged per credit. 
Again we find little evidence that credit intensity increased appreciably following the adoption of 
flat pricing, whether we examine the entire sample or restrict analysis to the UT System.  
 
                                                 
5 Some cautions are warranted. The samples are very small and not representative at a school level. Also, data 
cleaning measures used in 2008 eliminate 87% of the sample of students at the seven Minnesota State campuses 
during that year. These observations are dropped from all analysis and preferred specifications do not use Minnesota 
State campuses in 2008.  
Table D1. Effect of Flat Pricing on Credits Attempted, Other States
Panel A. Minnesota
Sample Controls Obs. At least 13 At least 15 Average credits
All schools, All years Full controls 1500 0.093*** 0.120*** 0.578***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.176)
UMN System, All years Full controls 900 0.075* -0.023 0.256
(0.043) (0.065) (0.252)
UMN System, All years Full controls + Fixed effects 900 0.010 -0.117 -0.113
(0.051) (0.089) (0.317)
Overall sample mean 1500 0.916 0.669 15.20
Panel B. Texas
Sample Controls At least 13 At least 15 Average credits
All schools, 2008 Full controls 2900 0.014 -0.033 -0.098
(0.030) (0.031) (0.109)
UT System, All years Full controls 1600 0.019 -0.095** -0.167
(0.044) (0.043) (0.152)
UT System, All years Full controls + Fixed effects 1600 -0.056 0.009 -0.048
(0.060) (0.061) (0.211)
Overall sample mean 4800 0.677 0.407 13.90
Credits Attempted
Credits Attempted
Notes: Sample is drawn from the 2004 and 2008 NPSAS, which is representative of students at public 4-year institutions in these years. Sample 
sizes rounded to nearest 100. Each observation is a person-term, weighted by sample weights. Full controls include indicators for year and 
semester, age, indicator for Pell recipient, GPA, EFC, family income, undergraduate level, and system (UMN or UT). Standard errors clustered 
by person appear in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
